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CHAPTER .5 
Torts 
ROBERT J. SHERER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§5.1. Malicious prosecution. A resident of Westwood brought an 
action of tort for malicious prosecution against the building inspector 
and the chief of police of the town, and the defendants' demurrer was 
sustained. In an opinion in which discussion of procedural problems 
consumed "time ... greatly disproportionate to the contribution, if 
any, to our jurisprudence,"l the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and 
held that the declaration, which alleged that, in a prosecution for 
violation of a zoning by-law, the defendants procured a conviction of 
the plaintiff in a district court2 by perjured testimony and suppression 
of evidence, stated a cause of action. The case thus constituted an 
exception to the general rule that conviction by the court in which 
the complaint is made is conclusive evidence of probable cause and 
a bar to an action for malicious prosecution even if a Superior Court 
jury subsequently acquits.8 
§5.2. Medical malpractice. In Delaney v. Rosenthall,l a verdict 
was directed for the defendant physician in a tort action brought by 
a patient whom he had treated following an industrial accident. On 
exceptions taken by the plaintiff, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that although there was no expert testimony that the defendant was 
negligent in treating the plaintiff, none was necessary in view of the 
evidence that the defendant failed to prescribe hospitalization of the 
plaintiff after it was clear that his thumb was infected, and that he left 
the treatment of the plaintiff largely to "a girl who had merely gradu-
ated from high school and had worked in a hospital as a nurses' aide 
for about two years .... "2 The case thus joins others of recent years 
in which the very nature of the doctor's acts was held not to require 
expert appraisal in order to reach a conclusion of negligence.8 
ROBERT J. SHERER is a member of the firm of Roche and Leen, Boston. 
§5.I. 1 Magaletta v. Millard, 846 Mass. 591, 195 N.E.2d 824 (1964). 
2 He was subsequently acquitted after a jury trial in the Superior Court. 
S Broussard v. Great Atlantic Be Pacific Tea Co., 824 Mass. 323, 826, 86 N.E.2d 
489, 440 (1949); Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co., 254 Mass. 202, 208-204, 150 N.E. 166 (1926). 
The case was finally tried in September, 1964, and resulted in a jury verdict 
for the defendants. 
§5.2. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 398, 196 N.E.2d 878. 
2Id. at 897, 196 N.E.2d at 878. 
3 Lipman v. Lustig, 846 Mass. 182, 190 N.E.2d 675 (1968), 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §5.2i Fitzgerald v. Leach. 587 Mass. 465. 150 N.E.2d 12 (1958). 
1
Sherer: Chapter 5: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1964
§5.3 TORTS 45 
§5.3. Libel and slander. In three cases decided during the 1964 
SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed an order of the 
Superior Court sustaining a demurrer to an action of tort for libel. 
Mabardi v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation 1 involved the so-
called Blatnik Committee investigation of fraudulent practices in the 
payment of damages for land taken by the Commonwealth under the 
federal highway program. The plaintiff, a Boston attorney, appeared 
before the committee to testify to his refusal to take part in alleged 
frauds and criminal activity. The lead story in the defendant's news-
paper on the same day was an account of the day's proceedings before 
the committee under a headline reading "Settlement Upped $2,000-
$400 Kickback Told." Three photographs appeared immediately 
below the headline, one of them being of the plaintiff and captioned 
"Mitchell A. Mabardi - Attorney." The other two photographs were 
identified as being of a state negotiator who had been convicted of 
increasing a settlement in return for a kickback, and of the president 
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, who was due to 
testify before the committee. No mention of the plaintiff was made 
in the article, although there was a reference to an unidentified lawyer 
who had solicited cases of persons whose property had been taken. 
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Reardon, the Court held that the 
context in which the plaintiff's picture appeared encouraged an 
inference that he was involved in the wrongdoing cited in the headline 
and discussed in the story. The test is not how a careful and thorough 
reader would construe the story before him, but whether a "consider-
able segment of the community" would read it as charging the plain-
tiff with wrongdoing. The standard is that applied to fraudulent 
advertising by such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission or the 
Post Office,2 and the rule appears to be that if a publication is sus-
ceptible of both defamatory and harmless meanings, the jury should 
decide the sense in which the public understands it.8 
Twohig v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation4 involved a political 
writer's comments on a state senate campaign. In 1962 the plaintiff, 
a former member of the House of Representatives, was engaged in a 
primary fight with an incumbent senator who was also president of 
the Senate. Five days before the primary, the defendant's political 
editor, in discussing the campaign in his column, made the statement: 
"The Senate president has reversed the anti-union charge Twohig is 
spreading about him by resurrecting some of Twohig's votes against 
Labor when he served on Beacon Hill." 
The Supreme Judicial Court, dividing 5 to 2, held that the declara-
tion stated a cause of action. Justice Kirk, speaking for the majority, 
held that the words quoted were capable "of being understood as an 
§5.11. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 719, 198 N.E.2d 1104. 
2 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 208 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 
19511); Gottlieb v. Schaffer, 141 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. N.Y. 1956). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 719, 722, 198 N.E.2d 1104, 1106, citing Twombly v. Monroe, 
1116 Mass. 464, 469 (1884). 
41146 Mass. 654, 195 N.E.2d 1120 (1964). 
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assertion of fact that the plaintiff, when he was a member of the 
General Court, had cast votes against labor." Such an interpretation, 
the majority felt, would "tend to discredit the plaintiff in the minds of 
workers in general and of members of labor unions in particular who 
constitute a considerable and respectable class of the community."1i 
The fact that the publication came during a political campaign 
was held to be an aggravating, rather than an excusing, circumstance. 
The Twohig case was decided on January 10, 1964, some two months 
prior to the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,s in which 
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, on First Amendment 
grounds, a judgment in favor of the police commissioner of Mont-
gomery, Alabama, in an action for libel against the New York Times. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for six of the justices,7 held the Consti-
tution to require "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual 
malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not."S 
The separate opinions in the case would go even further than the 
majority, Mr. Justice Goldberg stating the view that "the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and 
to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official 
conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses."9 
Justice Cutter, speaking for himself and Justice Spalding in dissent 
in the Twohig case,10 expressed similar views based on the policy of 
allowing free and full discussion of the public acts of public officials. 
Because of the healthy public skepticism concerning even more 
extreme statements in such an election period, as part of a cus-
tomary type of political appeal and comment (see Aldrich v. Boyle, 
328 Mass. 30, 32), this article should not be regarded as likely to 
injure the plaintiff's reputation in the community. To treat such 
an article as not defamatory would be consistent with the public 
interest in freedom of responsible discussion during an election 
campaign, a freedom likely to be restricted if such general com-
ment may be regarded as defamatory.l1 
The Cutter-Spalding view appears to be more in accord with the 
Supreme Court's policy of permiting free, even though irresponsible, 
discussion of the official acts of public officials, and it may very well 
prevail should the case be heard again by the Supreme Judicial Court 
after a trial of the merits.12 
Ii Id. at 655, 195 N.E.2d at 1121. 
61176 U.s. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). 
7 Justices Black and Goldberg concurred in the result in separate opinions in 
which Mr. Justice Douglas joined. 
S 1176 u.s. at 279-280, 84 Sup. Ct. at 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 706. 
91d. at 298. 84 Sup. Ct. at 7115. 11 L. Ed. 2d at 719. 
10 S46 Mass. 654. 656, 195 N.E.2d S20, S22 (1964). 
11 Id. at 656·657, 195 N.E.2d at 1122. 
12 It may be worthwhile to add the following footnote to history. The Senate 
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In Anthony v. Barss,18 the owner-editor-publisher of a newspaper 
was a plaintiff in an action for libel against one who had written to 
all of the plaintiff's advertisers asking whether they had taken time to 
examine the editorial content of the plaintiff's newspaper and whether 
they believed "that irritating advertising is the best way to keep cus-
tomers and contact new ones." The letter contained statements that 
"Nothing is more irritating than a presentation of the news (item or 
editorial) compiled without proper regard for facts," and "A lasting 
relationship between an advertiser and his customer is based on truth, 
not distortion." Since a jury might conclude that distortion meant 
an intentional falsification and departure from the facts, the letter 
was held actionable. 
§5.4. Products liability. In an opinion which, according to its 
author, involved "earnest study not only of the law but also of the 
culinary traditions of the Commonwealth,"1 the Court ruled that a 
fish bone could not, by all that is dear to New Englanders, be con-
sidered a foreign substance in a real New England fish chowder. Au-
thorities from Daniel Webster to Fanny Farmer were cited in support 
of the Court's position in denying recovery to the plaintiff for her 
"peculiarly New England injury."2 
In Harrod v. Edward E. Tower Company,3 recovery was denied the 
operator of a beauty shop whose hands were burned when a mixture 
containing the defendant's hair-coloring cream got under her rubber 
gloves as she was rinsing a customer's hair. The evidence, the Court 
held, left it conjectural whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused 
by the defendant's product or by the hydrogen peroxide or the homoge-
nized bleach with which she had mixed it. 
§5.5. Snow and ice. By statute, a municipality is liable in tort 
to any person injured as a result of its failure to exercise reasonable 
care and diligence to remedy or repair any defect in a public way.1 
It is not, however, liable for an injury sustained by reason of snow or 
ice on a way "if the place at which the in jury or damage was sustained 
was at the time of the accident otherwise reasonably safe and con-
venient for travelers."2 In Fortin v. City of Gardner,3 the Court held 
what should have been self-evident from a reading of Section 17, 
namely, that a city was not liable to one who was injured when a 
windrow of snow, which had been left by the side of the street during 
president referred to vacated his seat in early 1964 to become clerk of the Supreme 
Judicial Court. Twohig tried for the Senate seat at the primary held September 
10,1964, but lost again. 
18346 Mass. 401, 193 N.E.2d 329 (1963). 
§5.4. 1 Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7lU, 198 
N.E.2d 309. 
2Id. at 736, 198 N.E.2d at 312. 
3346 Mass. 532, 194 N.E.2d 392 (1963). 
§5.5. 1 C.L., c. 84, §15. 
2Id. §17. 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 747,198 N.E.2d 431. 
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snow clearance operations, collapsed under him as he was climbing 
over it. 
A different consideration was involved in Lewis v. Steinberg,4 an 
action against the owner of private property by one walking on the 
adjoining public sidewalk who slipped and fell on a mound of ice 
concealed by snow. The fall occurred right under a protruding sign, 
the end of which was "icy" and which had icicles protruding from it. 
The plaintiff's proof was ruled deficient for failure to show the origin 
of the ice on which she fell, since her case required proof of something 
other than a natural accumulation of either ice or snow.5 
Recovery was also denied a seaman returning to his ship, tied up 
at the defendant's wharf, who fell on a patch of ice which he had 
seen earlier, should have seen6 on his return, and couid have avoided.7 
The case thus may be classified with those holding that a plaintiff is 
expected to use his faculties for his own protection and guidance.s 
§5.6. Deceit. In Barrett Associates v. Aronson,1 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that one who had been induced to buy stock in a 
corporation could maintain an action of tort for deceit against those 
who induced him to buy by falsely representing that they intended to 
take no salary until the corporation was earning a profit, and that one 
of them stood to lose $25,000 if the business failed and so had set 
aside a reserve of $50,000 of his own funds to be used if the corporation 
needed money. 
The decision in Saxon Theatre Corporation of Boston v. Sage,2 
decided during the 1964 SURVEY year, indicates that Barrett might 
mark the limits to which the Court will go in holding a representation 
of a state of mind to be actionable. The plaintiff declared in both 
contract and tort, seeking to recover, alternatively, for breach of an 
alleged agreement to construct a motion picture theatre and lease it 
to the plaintiff, or for false representations made by the defendants 
"that their intention was to construct a theatre on ... [a certain] 
parcel of property, which they intended to lease to the plaintiff, to be 
operated by the plaintiff under a long-term lease."8 
Demurrers to all counts were sustained, the Court holding that the 
contract counts failed because the alleged agreement was too indefinite 
and lacking in essential details to be enforceable. The indefinite 
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597, 197 N.E.2d 698. 
5 Municipal ordinances or by-laws requiring owners of land to clear snow from 
their abutting sidew;llks have been held to be penal only, and violations of them 
give rise to no civil liability to an injured person. 
a The jury, in answer to a special question, found that the place was illuminated. 
7 Gadomki v. Union Oil Co. of Boston, 326 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1964). 
8 Benjamin v. O'Connell Be Lee Mfg. Co., 334 Mass. 646, 138 N.E.2d 126 (1956); 
Letieg v. Denholm Be McKay Co., 328 Mass. 120, 102 N.E.2d 86 (1951); O'Han1ey v. 
Norwood, 315 Mass. 440, 53 N.E.2d 3 (1944). 
§5.6. 1346 Mass. 150, 190 N.E.2d 867 (1963). See discussion in 1963 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §3.7. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1009,200 N.E.2d 241. 
8Id. at 1011, 200 N.E.2d at 243. 
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nature of the agreement was also fatal to the tort counts, the Court 
holding that (I) the representation of an intention to build a theatre 
was no more than an offer to negotiate, (2) the plaintiff could not 
reasonably rely on a representation of an intention to draw up and 
execute a mutually acceptable lease when essential terms of it had not 
been stated or settled, and (3) the representation that the defendants 
would build a theatre and lease it to the plaintiff was no more than an 
opinion or prophecy that an acceptable (to both parties) lease would 
be agreed upon.4 Barrett was distinguished on the ground that the 
intentions there misrepresented were definite and precise, and the case 
was classed with Yerid v. Mason,5 as falling "within the ordinary rule 
that false statements of opinion, of conditions to exist in the future, 
or of matters promissory in nature are not actionable."6 
The result appears to be sound. Massachusetts cases have shown a 
reluctance on the part of the Court to deny a plaintiff relief on the 
ground that an agreement which he sought to enforce was too vague 
or indefinite.7 In view of the liberality in making enforceable agree-
ments out of parties' promises, it seems entirely proper that a party 
who fails to show an enforceable contract should not be permitted to 
make the same indefinite statements the basis of an action of tort. 
§5.7. Unfair competition. Problems involving competition by the 
former owner of a business against the purchaser of his former business 
are as old as Old Corner Book Store v. Upham.1 The 1964 SURVEY 
year presented two more cases involving the problem. In one the 
parties inserted a specific covenant against competition in the sales 
agreement; in the other they did not. 
In Sulmonetti v. Hayes,2 the defendant, who was in financial diffi-
culty, sold his oil business to the plaintiff. The sale included the 
assets, good will, and name, and the plaintiff also undertook to pay 
off all indebtedness and to employ the defendant on mutually agree-
able terms. The defendant agreed not to re-enter the fuel oil business 
in Worcester County "in any capacity, directly or indirectly," for ten 
years from the date of the agreement or the termination of his employ-
ment by the plaintiff, whichever was later. 
Within two years, and while the defendant was still employed by 
the plaintiff, the defendant's wife organized a new corporation and 
went into the fuel oil business from their home; his mother terminated 
the plaintiff's tenancy of the premises from which the defendant had 
operated his former business; and, using the plaintiff's customer list, 
<lId. at 1012, 200 N.E.2d at 244-245. 
5341 Mass. 527, 170 N.E.2d 718 (1960), 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4, 1962 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.5. 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1009. 1013, 200' N.E.2d 241, 245, citing Yerid v. Mason, 
supra note 4. 
7 Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 429, 73 N.E.2d 731 (1947); Weiner v. Pictorial 
Paper Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 20 N.E.2d 458 (1939). 
§5.7. 1194 Mass. 101, 80 N.E. 228 (1907). 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 198 N.E.2d 297, also noted in §6.1 infra. 
6
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the defendant's wife successfully took some two hundred customers 
from it. 
Although the wife had not signed the purchase and sale agreement, 
the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the evidence clearly established 
that she "deliberately and willfully connived with her husband and 
purposefully acted both with him and independently of him, to ap-
propriate to herself and her husband the good will that the [plain-
tiff] had purchased from [the defendant]." Her conduct was thus 
held to amount to a total disregard of the concept of fair dealing 
underlying the principle restricting the right of a seller of a business 
to compete with the buyer "in such a way as to deprive the buyer of 
the good will which he has purchased."8 An injunction identical to 
that issued against the husband was ordered against the wife. 
Athough no specific covenant against future competition was made 
in Cap's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Caproni} the Court held one to be implied 
by the nature of the transaction. The plaintiff corporation was the 
creature of three brothers who operated an automobile parts and 
allied equipment business. In 1961 one of the brothers, owning 40 per-
cent of the stock, agreed to buyout the two others, paying in part in 
cash and in part by two notes, payable in ten years and secured by 
mortgages and pledges of the stock and the plaintiff's real estate. 
Within eight months the defendant, who had sold his interest in the 
plaintiff's business, opened a competing business less than one mile 
from the plaintiff's place of business. In affirming a final decree en-
joining the defendant from engaging in the auto parts business, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that "the circumstances as found by the 
trial judge fully justify the finding of an implied covenant under the 
TobinG standard ... "6 
The extent to which a state may, either by statute or through ap-
plication of its common law, prevent "unfair competition" was seri-
ously restricted by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sears, 
Roebuck &- Co. v. StifJel CO.T The case involved a suit in a federal 
court in Illinois by Stiffel to prevent Sears from infringing its patent 
for a pole lamp and for unfair competition. The lower courts held 
that the patent was invalid for lack of invention but allowed recovery 
under the Illinois laws against unfair competition. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that a state could not invoke its own laws of 
unfair competition to give a manufacturer patent-like protection of an 
article not eligible for the protection of a federal patent. 
The StifJel case was discussed but held to be inapplicable in Edgar 
H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene,S a case involving common law 
copyright. Unlike statutory copyright, which is a creature of federal 
8Id. at 698, 198 N.E.2d at 801. 
.1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 471, 196 N.E.2d 874, abo noted in §6.1 infra. 
G Tobin v. Cody, 848 Mass. 716, 180 N .E.2d 652 (1962). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 471. 474. 196 N.E.2d 874. 876. 
T !l76 U.S. 225. 84 Sup. Ct. 784. 11 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1964). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 647. 197 N.E.2d 886. also noted in §11.6 infra. 
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statutes, common law copyright is a matter of state law. It protects 
an author's rights to his works only until there has been a publication. 
In the Wood case the issue was whether there had been a publication 
of an architect's plans so as to disentitle him to relief in equity against 
a former employee and his new employers who had taken a set of the 
plans and constructed a building identical to that designed by the 
plaintiff. On appeal from a final decree dismissing the bill after the 
sustaining of a demurrer and denial of leave to amend, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that neither filing the original plans with the 
building department nor constructing a building from them consti-
tuted a "publication" of them so as to destroy the common law cbpy-
right. Relief, in the event that construction was already started, was 
limited to the fair market value of the plans.9 
§5.8. Survival of action. At common law an action of tort did 
not survive the death of the tort-feasor, and no action could be brought 
or maintained against his estate. l To some extent this common law 
rule has been changed in Massachusetts,2 and an action of tort for 
damage to real or personal property survives the death of either the 
tort-feasor or the injured party. The statute, however, has been held 
not to apply to malpractice suits against an attorney.8 This rule was 
reaffirmed during the 1964 SURVEY year in Gallagher v. First National 
Bank of Boston,' the Court holding that no action lay against the 
executor of an attorney's estate for his negligently failing to deliver a 
will he had prepared. As a result of his failure to deliver the will, 
the decedent's property had been distributed as an intestate estate, 
and the plaintiff, who had been given $500 plus one third of the 
residue under the will, received no part of the estate. The Court held 
that the plaintiff's loss of her legacy did not constitute damage to her 
personal property.1> 
§5.9. Liability of the Commonwealth. Smith v. Commonwealth l 
presented the question of whether the Commonwealth could be held 
liable for damage caused by the bursting of a Metropolitan District 
Commission water main as the result of negligent construction, opera-
tion, or maintenance. A judge of the Superior Court held not and 
allowed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, 
holding that the provision in General Laws, Chapter 92, relating to 
the Metropolitan Water District,2 did not have the effect of making 
the Commonwealth liable in tort for damages caused by negligent 
operation of any waterworks. The petitioner relied on a provision in 
9Id. at 661, 197 N.E.2d at 896. 
§5.8. 1 Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 8S, 85, 188 N.E. 808, 809 (I92S). 
2 G.L., c. 228, §l. 
8 Connors v. Newton National Bank, SS6 Mass. 649, 147 N.E.2d 185 (1958); 
Jenks v. Hoag, 179 Mass. 58S, 61 N.E.221 (1901). 
'S46 Mass. 587, 195 N.E.2d 68 (1964). 
I> Id. at 591, 195 N.E.2d at 70. 
§5.9. 11964 Mass. Adv. ,sh. 765,198 N.E.2d 420. 
2 G.L., c. 92, §§10-S2. 
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Chapter 92, Section 15,s as imposing such liability, but the Court re-
jected this idea, the majority noting that the sole express provision 
in Sections 10 through 32 of the chapter relating to the right to recover 
damages was the provision in Section 32 referring to the eminent 
domain law. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§5.10. Physicians: Exemption from civi1liability. General Laws, 
Chapter 112, Section 12B,1 exempting physicians from liability in tort 
for-emergency treatment rendered at the scene of any motor vehicle 
accident, was amended to include physicians residing in other states 
and duly registered therein. It formerly applied only to physicians 
registered in Massachusetts.2 
Physicians have also been required to report to the Department of 
Publi~, Welfare any treatment of injuries to children under sixteen 
which the physician has reasonable cause to believe were inflicted by 
the parent or person responsible for the care of such child. Such a 
report shall not constitute slander or libel.s 
§5.1l. Contribution among joint tort-feasors. The 1963 SURVEY 
reported the failure of the 1963 legislature to enact proposed legisla-
tion which would have introduced the federal-style of third-party 
practice1 into Massachusetts.2 The 1964 session enacted such legis-
lation.s 
§5.12. Charitable immunity.l The legislature rejected the hardy 
perennial to make charitable corporations operating hospitals, sana-
toriums, infirmaries, and convalescent, nursing, or rest homes liable in 
tort.2 
§5.13. Other legislative rejections. The legislature also rejected 
legislation making the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions 
liable in tort1 and three bills imposing vicarious liability on parents 
for damage or injury caused by minor children.2 It also rejected an 
act enlarging the duty of a landlord to maintain premises for use by 
S "The commission shall keep all water works constructed or maintained by it 
and all bridges built by it across the reservoir upon the Nashua River safe, and 
shall have charge of, use, maintain and operate the same, and the commonwealth 
shall be exclusively responsible for all damages caused thereby or by any defect 
or want of repair therein." 
§5.l0. 1 Inserted by Acts of 1962, c. 217. See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.7. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 59. 
8Id. c. 534, inserting G.L., c. 119, §§39A-39B. 
§5.ll. 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 14. 
2See 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § !U4. 
8 Acts of 1964, c. 696, inserting G.L., c. 231, §4B. 
§5.12. 1 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 4.5. 
2 House Doc. No. 1944. 
§5.13. 1 House Doc. No. 2894. 
2 House Doc. Nos. 1946, 2143, Senate Doc. No. 180. 
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his tenants,a as well as a proposed act providing that negligence of the 
operator of a motor vehicle shall not be imputed to the owner.4 
3 House Doc. No. 783. 
4 House Doc. No. 2361. 
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